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ABSTRACT
To reduce or eliminate the impact of a cyber-attack on an organization, preparations to
recover a failed system and/or data are usually made in anticipation of such an attack. To avoid
a false sense of security, these preparations should, as closely as possible, reflect the
organization’s capabilities, in order to inform future improvement and avoid unattainable goals.
There is an absence of a strong basis for the selection of the metrics that are used to measure
preparation. Informal and unreliable processes are widely used, and they often result in metrics
that conflict with the organization’s capabilities and interests. The goal of this research was to
establish a process that could be used to assess and validate an organization’s recovery
objectives by ensuring the selection of metrics that align with the organization’s true
capabilities.
To form the basis for a formalized process for selecting recovery metrics, a decision
model is proposed to ensure that, at the minimum, an organization’s technical capabilities are
considered, and that on the other hand, risk tolerance thresholds are not exceeded. A short
survey of qualified practitioners was conducted to determine the preferred recovery metrics and
other important priorities based on the expected impact of a cyber-attack. The results revealed
that organizations mostly prefer to use the popular or well-known recovery objectives (RTO
and RPO), and it was demonstrated that by using a clear and well-defined process, these metrics
can be objectively and reliably established. Finally, considering the capabilities of an
organization’s information systems, mathematical relationships between these metrics and
other existing recovery metrics are proposed as part of the decision model to ensure that these
recovery objectives are established within the organization’s technical and economic limits.
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The resulting artifact was first evaluated using a numeric experiment to demonstrate its
mathematical and technical soundness. It was then compared directly to previously proposed
models using five different criteria to validate its ability to contribute meaningfully to the
solution sought for the research problem. The comparison confirmed the utility, feasibility,
repeatability, and reliability of the proposed solution. The artifact was then applied in a case
study using an illustrative scenario comprising of real-world statistics. The findings were used
to demonstrate that if a history of an information system’s performance in preparatory activities
such as backup operations and recovery drills is incorporated into decisions concerning the
selection of recovery objectives, the resulting metrics will more accurately represent the ability
to satisfactorily recover the systems in an actual incident. This was verified by
recommendations based on established frameworks. Finally, the resulting model was presented
to qualified experts for expert opinion, and positive feedback was received from both technical
and business operations perspectives. It was then concluded that recovery objectives can be
established in alignment with the relevant details of an organization’s information systems, and
that the impact on the organization’s ability to conduct recovery operations more effectively
will be positive.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, most organizations have addressed the threats posed by both natural and manmade disasters by establishing recovery objectives. These are thresholds by which they assess
their readiness to recover from an incident and return to normal operation. Of the several
recovery objectives that have been proposed, the two most important and most popularly used
are the Recovery Time Objective (RTO) and the Recovery Point Objective (RPO) (Thomas,
Gordon, & Galligher, 2018). The RTO establishes the timeframe within which the organization
expects to recover the failed system to full functionality. On the other hand, the RPO usually
refers to the tolerable data loss expectancy (Thomas et al., 2018). Both metrics have been used
extensively and quite successfully to establish an organization’s position on the preparedness
scale, as well as its ability to recover from a severe cyber incident. In the context of
organizational cybersecurity strategy and since recovery for cyber incidents and natural
disasters are planned to use similar architectures (Sicard, 2019), many organizations use the
same metrics to assess their readiness for cyber incidents by targeting both the amount of data
that can be recovered and the timeliness of that recovery. However, how these metrics are
established for non-adversarial incidents may not necessarily be applicable for cyber incidents,
especially intentional or adversarial attacks.

1.1. Background of the Problem
As the threats posed by cyber-attacks to organizations increase in sophistication and volume,
organizations are compelled to take a preemptive approach in understanding these threats in
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order to defeat them. This has in many cases moved “preparedness” closer to the top of the
cybersecurity agenda (Gomes, Ahokangas, & Owusu, 2016). As part of the preparation for
cyber incident recovery, organizations need to test both their ability to recover their critical
systems and their ability to initiate and successfully execute the steps in the recovery process.
The results of these tests, in the absence of an actual incident, can be used to demonstrate
preparedness or lack thereof. This is usually done to satisfy or justify the dedication of resources
to incident recovery in such areas as budgeting and regulatory compliance (Podofillini,
Wolfgang, Bruno & Bozidar, 2015). To use these results for the said purposes, the performance
of the system during a test or assessment is captured and recorded.
Experience and research in both industry and academia have shown that Recovery
Objectives are established by organizations using subjective and informal methods, either to
satisfy regulatory requirements or merely to demonstrate conformance to good practice
(Bodeau, Graubart, McQuaid, & Woodill, 2018).

1.2. Research Motivation
Several studies, as will be seen later in this section, have shown that when recovery planning
is poor, most organizations are unable to recover from a successful and severe cyber incident,
and in some cases, the consequences are extreme for these organizations. About 60% of
businesses will fail within 6 months of a severe cyber-attack (Koulopoulos, 2017), and 50% of
organizations without a recovery plan will never reopen for business after a major incident
(Rabbani, Soufi, & Torabi, 2016). Steinberg (2019) cited a study done by Accenture in 2019
which noted that 43% of all cyber-attacks were aimed at small businesses and that only 14% of
them were prepared to defend themselves. The article also noted cybercrime as the “fastestgrowing form of criminal activity” (Steinberg, 2019). These numbers demonstrate the urgent
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need for the reliability of adequate preparation in organizational cyber incident recovery. In
addition, there is an absence of legislative or regulatory requirement for organizations to recover
failed systems within a certain timeframe, leaving organizations to set their own recovery
standards.
A major corner piece of these standards is the set of recovery objectives used by
organizations to assess readiness for cyber incidents. The most widely used of these objectives
are the Recovery Time Objective (RTO) and the Recovery Point Objective (RPO). A recent
study by Goodwin (2021) noted that the average time between backups is 24 hours while the
most common RPO and RTO are 1 – 4 hours and 4 – 8 hours respectively. Another study by
Veritas (2020) revealed that 66% of organizations estimated more than a five-day recovery time
from incidents such as ransomware if the ransom is not paid. This demonstrates a mismatch
between the recovery objectives being selected and the organizations’ recovery capabilities.
In system recovery operations, the reliability of both the backup data and the process in
which it is used depends greatly on how the backup is collected in the first place. This suggests
that aside from quality and integrity, the timing, with regards to the collection and use of backup
data, is an essential factor. Both the RTO and RPO are references to several points in time, and
proper alignment of these points in time with the overall process can improve the final outcome
of data and system recovery.

1.3. Research Problem
Organizations periodically test their capabilities in systems recovery by assessing their
technical and administrative resources. This is usually done for several reasons that include
regulatory requirements, internal cybersecurity hygiene, and stakeholder assurance. To
demonstrate or test preparedness for recovery, certain thresholds are established and used as a
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yardstick to evaluate recovery capabilities. It is generally in the organization’s best interest to
keep the RTO and RPO low (Alhazmi, 2015), and since reducing these numbers increases the
cost of recovery planning (Alhazmi, 2015), the dynamics between business interests and IT
interests are almost always in conflict. Regardless of the reason why an organization conducts
these assessments, a clear method for setting these objectives does not exist in either academic
or industry lexicon. Onwubiko (2020) also noted that research dedicated to cyber incident
recovery are unfortunately lacking.
Recovery metrics have traditionally been limited, either to an organization’s technical
capabilities or to mere suggestions by its business operations of the threshold of tolerable
impact. This seldom reflects an organization’s actual tolerance or risk appetite. Recovery
metrics that do not reflect an organization’s true capabilities, when used as a basis for testing
for preparedness, can provide a false sense of security for the organization and result in a failure
to recover the failed systems within reasonable parameters in the event of an actual cyber
incident. For this reason, the parameters that define the relationship among the recovery metrics
should be well defined so that when establishing these metrics, the limits are understood, and
unnecessary overlaps are avoided.
1.3.1. Issues with Recovery Time
If a clear distinction between the Maximum Tolerable Downtime (MTD) and Recovery
Time Objective (RTO) is not made, these two terms tend to be used interchangeably, and this
can present problems in the long run (NIST, 2021). One way to distinguish between the two is
to establish a mathematical relationship between both terms. Taken quite literally, and
according to many standard definitions, the MTD is the total amount of time an organization is
willing to accept for an outage or disruption during which it must recover its systems and data
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to avoid an intolerable impact to the organization (NIST, 2021). This means that the RTO, also
if taken literally, should be an objective or goal set by the organization to test its ability to
recover its systems and/or data within the timeframe established by the MTD (Kawaguchi,
2013). If this is the case, then as noted by NIST (2021) the relationship between the MTD and
RTO can be expressed as follows:
𝑀𝑇𝐷 ≥ 𝑅𝑇𝑂

(1)

While this seems mathematically feasible it presents a problem which is that, at some
point, the MTD could be equal to the RTO. This also means that if the RTO is exceeded or if
recovery is not successfully completed within this timeframe, the organization would already
be experiencing an intolerable impact from the incident. For this reason, it is important to
establish the RTO in a way that accounts for the restoration of the organization’s critical IT
infrastructure sub-systems and still leave a sufficient time “cushion” between it and the MTD
(Kawaguchi, 2013).
1.3.2. Issues with Recovery Point
An organization has to determine how much data it is capable of recovering and how
much it is willing to lose following a disruptive incident (NIST, 2021). Because all
organizations process and store different amounts of data, this value is usually expressed as a
reference to a point in time rather than as a quantity of data, using the Recovery Point Objective
(RPO) metric (Chow, Deshpande, Seshadri & Liu, 2021). Recovery of systems and data is
usually done using Backups which are essentially a detailed record of the status of the
organization’s systems and data at a point in time. This record is taken in a particular cadence
that is usually a reflection of the organization’s commitment to “Availability.” More frequent
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backups usually require a higher investment in the technologies and other resources that make
them possible (Goodwin, 2021).
To minimize data loss following a disruptive incident, information systems should be
restored using the most recent backup data (NIST, 2021). This, if done successfully, restores
the system to the most recent point in time that the last valid backup was taken. This also
establishes the technical limitation of an organization’s recovery systems and makes it
impossible to achieve an RPO that does not mathematically agree with the Backup Frequency.
In other words, the relationship between the RPO and the Backup Frequency represented as F
in equation 2 is that RPO must be larger or equal to F. This relationship can be expressed as
follows:
𝐹 ≤ 𝑅𝑃𝑂

(2)

Similar to the issues with the RTO and MTD relationship, the Backup frequency F can
equal RPO at some point. This means that the inability to successfully restore data from a
backup due to a reason such as the failure or corruption of backup data can make it uncertain
that the recovery point objective will be achieved (Goodwin, 2021).
1.3.3. Problem Statement
Since organizations have the prerogative responsibility to select their own recovery
objectives, without a clearly defined process there is no way to assure that these selections are
not in conflict with the organization’s limits with regards to tolerance for outage and recovery
capabilities. A recent study completed by Goodwin (2021) revealed that, on average, backups
are taken at intervals of 24 hours, while the average RPO is 1 – 4 hours.
Other metrics involved in system recovery such as MTD and Backup Frequency are
objectively obtainable from business processes, but their relationships with the standard and
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generally accepted recovery objectives have largely remained undefined. As a result, the
process for selecting recovery objectives is usually subjective, varied, and mostly informal. The
potential consequences of this have created a gap in incident response and recovery that
researchers have attempted but have not been able to close. One of such consequences is that
recovery objectives, being the responsibility of the organizations, due to a lack of a formalized
process, are not logically defensible. Also, from the perspective of accountability and due
diligence, they are difficult to justify. A review of the previous work done in the attempts to
address this problem is presented in Chapter 2.
1.3.4.

Research Question

The inconsistencies that exist in the relationship among these recovery metrics present
a problem in how the metrics are derived and established. This has led to the following research
question:
How can Recovery Time and Data Loss Expectancy metrics be established so that they truly
reflect an organization’s ability to recover its systems from a cyber incident within tolerable
limits?
This research answers this question by proposing a decision model for deriving logically
applicable and defensible recovery objectives or metrics that demonstrate an organization’s true
capabilities and recognizes its tolerance limits.

1.4. Research Objective
The objective of this research is to address the research problem by identifying what
organizational concerns and interests are, regarding the selection of recovery objectives, and to
offer a feasible solution based on this understanding that is aimed at closing the research gap.
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Specifically, the intended contribution would be a decision model to standardize the process of
establishing the well-known and preferred recovery metrics (RTO and RPO) in a manner that is
objective and feasible. It is also expected that recovery objectives established using this model
will be more dependable as they will be verifiable, defensible, and respectful of the
organization’s technical and economic limits.

1.5. Assumptions
To aid the efforts in this research and support the creation and validation of the decision
model, the following assumptions were made:
•

A Business Impact Analysis is performed, and the results demonstrate the organization’s
maximum tolerance for system outage

•

Information systems are organized in a logical hierarchy, and therefore recovered
according to the layout of sub-systems in the order of this hierarchy, as shown in Table
1

•

A recovery operation, specifically with regards to testing, will involve all layers or
subsystems in the IT environment

•

For components outside the organization’s control, the reliability of networks as defined
by Xu, Qian, and Hu (2018), and other supporting and auxiliary resources are assured

•

There is a degree of dependency between a subsystem and that which precedes it in the
hierarchy of the IT architecture

•

Full functionality of a subsystem requires all functionality of all hierarchically preceding
subsystems.
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In Table 1, the subsystems of a typical IT infrastructure are shown in the hierarchical order
of operation [and therefore recovery] starting from the bottom. This hierarchy is based partly
on the technical dependencies as expressed in the OSI and TCP/IP reference models but was
modeled after existing recovery management levels shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, based on
technical dependencies.
Table 1. Recovery Hierarchy Stack
Tier

Infrastructure Layers (Sub-system)

5

Application

4

Database

3

Network

2

Compute

1

Storage

Fig. 1 is a representation of the logical order in which recovery technologies are organized
in a virtualized environment. The “Recovery Hierarchy Stack” presented in Table 1 is an
adjustment of the components of the “Virtualization” layer and the “Volume Management”
layer to reflect a basic organization’s IT infrastructure and reflect the recovery process for
disruptions specific to cyber incidents. Also, Table 1 refers to the “services” of each of the
layers within the organization’s IT environment and does not include components or resources
that may not be readily available for recovery operations. Fig. 2 is also an example of the
application of a layered recovery technology process to disaster recovery.
Regardless of the exact configuration used, it is evident that the layers represented are
similar. It is also important to note that the “Network” layer referenced in the Recovery
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Hierarchy Stack is the internal network, and is separate from, and along with all the other tiers,
dependent on the reliability of external network infrastructure as defined by Xu et al (2017).

Figure 1. Levels of Disaster Recovery Technology (Zhu et al., 2017)

Figure 2. DR Layers (Baham et al., 2017)
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1.6. Paper Outline
In Chapter 1, details of the research problem were discussed. These included a description
and relevance of the popular recovery objectives, the research question addressed, and
assumptions made. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, the related
work of several authors and researchers who have attempted to objectify the selection and use
of recovery metrics are presented. Chapter 3 discusses the items required to craft a solution to
the research problem as defined by practitioners and prior postulations. In Chapter 4, the
research methodology used is presented, discussed, and justified. The artifact or decision model
is presented and discussed in Chapter 5, and its components and potential performance are
examined and evaluated in Chapter 6. The results of the evaluation are presented in Chapter 7,
and the conclusion of the research along with suggested future research work are discussed in
the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
Cyber threats and incidents continue to emerge and have evolved over time, and this has
caused scholars and researchers in both academia and industry to pursue several ways to
establish the most widely used assessment metrics (RTO and RPO). Some researchers have
proposed the use of the Analytical Hierarchy Process but have mostly been focused on the
development of Information Security policies. Other proposals have been offered, some of
which feature several models and their attempted use to derive the popular metrics (RTO and
RPO), while others offer a completely different set of metrics.

2.2. Multi-criteria Decision Making
Authors, researchers, and practitioners, as discussed in the next paragraph, have used the
Analytical Hierarchy Process to facilitate and improve decision-making processes in
information security. However, these efforts have targeted either the development of
information security policies or the selection of information security controls. None so far have
been geared towards the factors that affect the objectivity of the metrics that guide the recovery
of systems with regards to time and data.
Using the Analytical Hierarchy Process, Gedam and Meshram (2019) sought to prioritize
security requirements in Object-Oriented Software Development. Cabrera, Luceno Reyes, and
Lasco (2021) also attempted to improve decision-making processes by employing the
Analytical Hierarchy Process. They used security goals (the CIA triad) as the alternatives and
the four aspects of information security (technology, management, economy, and culture) as
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criteria. Tariq et al. (2020) recognized the importance of prioritizing information security
decisions around some criteria, especially with the advent of wireless sensor networks and cloud
computing and proposed the “Fuzzy AHP.” In a case study on the Evaluation of Disaster
Recovery (DR) strategies, Mendonca, Lima, Andrade, Araujo, and Kim (2020) adopted Little’s
Law by dividing the number of requests by the arrival rate to obtain the Mean Response Time
to compute RTO and RPO. None of the aforementioned attempts address an organization’s
ability to recover its systems and data within tolerable limits.

2.3. Other Metrics
In the context of organizational cybersecurity, and because the impact of cyber incidents,
like those of natural disasters, are both hard to predict, and impact the organization in ways
similar to natural disasters (Carias et al., 2019), many organizations prefer to use the same
metrics as those used for natural disasters to assess their readiness for cyber incidents. This
means that they consider both the ability to recover data and the timeliness of a recovery
operation. Recently, different schools of thought have emerged, suggesting that the nature of
cyber incidents differs enough from traditional disasters to justify a different approach in
assessing recovery performance (Podofillini et al., 2015). The reason often given is that cyberattacks, in general, differ in their methods of operation, therefore it can be difficult to accurately
establish the exact time, scale, and even impact of an attack.
Bodeau, Graubart, McQuaid, and Woodill (2018) defined cyber resilience as a combination
of three different metrics which are, Security Metrics, Resilience Metrics, and Risk Metrics.
They state that any single metric should be treated as the starting point of a discussion, as all
metrics might mean different things to different stakeholders. Bodeau et al. (2018) also
acknowledged some challenges regarding complexity, contextuality, and feasibility. They offer
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these as their reasons for pursuing a more comprehensive view of resilience rather than just the
recovery of systems and data. They argued that goals such as anticipation, adaptation,
prevention, reconstitution, and damage limitation belong in the context of cyber resilience and
recovery. The authors offer alternative metrics to the traditional recovery metrics as more
appropriate. Two of the more prominent of these are, Measure of Effectiveness (MoE) and
Measure of Performance (MoP). Overall, the approach the authors advocated for seems very
robust and complex. As many as 47 different metrics were identified and the advocacy for a
single figure metric was acknowledged. Finally, the fact that many organizations don’t
necessarily base engineering and budgeting decisions on these metrics was pointed out in this
publication. Bodeau et al. (2018) also stated that many organizations simply establish metrics
to demonstrate compliance or conformance to good practices.
Podofillini et al., (2015) describes the traditional methods of using backups for recovery as
appropriate for physical risks and claimed that they usually fail in the case of cyber disasters.
They acknowledged that recovery procedures and metrics that address cyber incidents
specifically are in their early stages, but that returning to normal operation within specific times,
even if the cyber incident has not been fully resolved, can be crucial depending on the type of
organization and its overall mission. They used the Sony Entertainment cyber incident as
evidence that RTO and RPO are not feasible because, after the attack on Sony, several
computers stayed inaccessible for several days regardless of what their established recovery
objectives were. Podofillini et al., (2015) acknowledged metrics such as the Non-Disclosure
Objective (NDO) and the Recovery Consistency Objective (RCO) as more appropriate metrics
for measuring the ability of an organization to recover from a cyber incident and return to
normal business operation. They also pointed out the multiple-stage nature of some cyber-
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attacks and claimed that the exact time of compromise can be difficult to determine. Finally,
Podofillini et al., (2015) noted that there is no generally accepted resilience level for every
industry. They suggested that recovery planning should be tailored to specific organizational
needs, but also noted that they expect that in the future, regulatory authorities will impose
recovery obligations on different industries.
Arul et al., (2017) noted that cyber-attacks happen when information or systems are exposed
and exploited. In their article for the Cloud Security Alliance, the authors recognized that
sometimes the time of discovery is not the same as the time of occurrence. With that, they
proposed a new set of metrics to identify and track this lapse in time. These are, Elapsed Time
to Identify Threat (ETIT) and Elapsed Time to Identify Failure (ETIF). This is further
acknowledgment that cyber incidents are organic in nature and can best be objectified by a
strong alignment with the objectives of the organization.
2.3.1. Summary of Other Metrics
The metrics suggested by previous researchers all reference one important factor in
system recovery which is “time.” This is because the impact of a cyber incident on an
organization, when the adversarial intent is to disrupt system and data availability, can be
referenced to time. The cost of the downtime caused by the incident and the loss of valuable
data based on the amount of recoverable data appear to be consistent goals of all the offerings
made so far.

2.4. Previous Models and Solutions for RTO and RPO
Research efforts in the past have produced processes or models that were intended to address
the stated research problem. However, these efforts have in one way or the other, fallen short
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of providing a reliable set of metrics that are logically defensible, especially in the context of
this research.
2.4.1. Gap Time Reduction
Kawaguchi (2013) offered a “Twin Model” which features a combined “RTO Model”
and “Current Recovery Time (CRT) Model” to achieve a “Gap Time Reduction” which is the
reduction of the time between the CRT and the MTD. The authors present that understanding
the desired gap between the MTD [which was represented as the Maximum Tolerable Period
of Disruption (MTPD)] and the CRT, prior to setting the RTO, is essential. This approach
does not consider the gap between the MTD and the RTO, as exceeding the RTO by an
uncontrolled margin puts the organization’s recovery time either dangerously within “striking
distance” of the MTD, or even above it. Finally, although Kawaguchi (2013) differentiates
between the currently stated recovery capabilities and the recovery goal with regards to the
time of recovery, the model proposed only utilizes the organization’s budget rather than a
history of its past performances.
2.4.2. Multi-Objective Scenario-Based Stochastic Robust Optimization
A Multi-Objective Scenario-Based Stochastic Robust Optimization model proposed
by Sahebjamnia, Torabi, Mansouri, and Salehi (2011) was aimed at uncertainties introduced
by the likelihood and impact of a disaster. The researchers attempted to generate efficient
recovery solutions by maximizing the value of recovery capability and completeness, and
minimizing the cost of recovery (Sahebjamnia, Torabi, Mansouri & Salehi, 2011). In this
model, the types of disasters planned for are primarily natural, therefore the likelihood and
impact variables considered only apply to natural disasters. This implies that the resulting risk
calculations do not include the characteristics of a typical cyber incident and are therefore
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unreliable in the context of this research. Also, the product of the model is a single objective
scenario, the Recovery Time, along with its relative associated cost. A relationship with the
maximum tolerable limit is not expressed and neither are the recovery point and acceptable
data loss parameters.
2.4.3. Smart Recovery Advisor
Aimed at fostering Continuous Data Protection (CDP), Chow, Deshpande, Seshadri &
Liu (2021) offered the Smart Recovery Advisor (SRA) which focuses on optimizing the
selection of a recovery point. The primary objective and capability of the SRA are to detect
and recommend valid restore points to which recovery operations can be targeted. Focusing
on the recovery point and data loss, this model features a feedback system that uses a
“learning” process based on the performance and history of the backup and restore operations.
The SRA however does not have any features that take into consideration the organization’s
socio-economic priorities. It also does not address recovery times as well as the organization’s
tolerance in periods of disruption.
2.4.4. Computer-Aided Disaster Recovery Planning Tools
As system recovery depends mainly on the availability of alternate data, data and
systems need to be backed up to ensure this availability (Alhazmi, 2015). Alhazmi (2015)
acknowledged that a knowledge of the organization’s priorities is necessary for adequate
recovery planning. Based on this, and IBM’s 7 tier system for disaster recovery planning
(DRP), Alhazmi (2015) proposed a software tool that enhances disaster recovery planning by
simulating IT DRP systems. This system neither informs the creation of recovery objectives
in a way that accounts for prior system performance nor factors the organization’s tolerance
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for disruptive incidents. It only compares the selection of different DRP solutions based on
available technology and their associated costs.
2.4.5. Contingency Planning in Digital Recording Company
In a study done on a music and digital recording company, Ruddin, Santoso, Indrajit,
and Dazki (2021) discussed different types of threats that an organization’s information
systems and data can face. As part of this work, they define the estimation of the MTD as a
product of the BIA. According to Ruddin et al. (2021), disaster recovery planning should be
conducted in nine stages, the seventh of which covers the consideration of financial and nonfinancial impact. The first limitation of the proposed process is that it is focused on a single
industry and therefore does not account for the differences that might exist from one industry
to another. Another limitation is that no provision informs a constant improvement process
that takes updated system performance data as input. Finally, the process offered by Ruddin et
al. (2021) is neither formalized nor standardized.
2.4.6. DRP of Data Systems for Indonesia University
With its basis on ISO 27031, an international standard that provides guidance for
information and communication technology readiness for business continuity (ISO/IEC,
2011), Meilani, Arief, and Habibitullah (2019) designed a DRP for an Indonesian university’s
data systems. In this work, Meilani et al. (2019) detailed the types of risks that organizations’
information systems face, however priorities relating to regulatory or public relations
concerns were not addressed. Also, based on the risks acknowledged by Meilani et al. (2019),
the RTO and RPO assessments performed have similar limitations. The results of the study
conducted by Meilani et al. (2019) show a strong dependency on alternate sites as a DRP
strategy. However, in the absence of a reliable failover system, or where backup data is
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required for when malware corrupts both primary and secondary systems, redundancy that is
provided by having multiple sites does not offer reliable protection.
2.4.7. Regression-based Recovery Time Predictions
A process based on Regression Analysis techniques proposed by Podaras,
Moirogiorgou, and Zervakis (2021) is intended to calculate a prediction of the recovery time
for a given system. Podaras et al. (2021) also acknowledge Recovery Priorities as an integral
part of Business Continuity Management. The model proposed offers a standard mathematical
background for predicting the resumption time of business processes. It also features an
inclusion of non-technical priorities for the estimation of recovery times. The model is an
attempt to improve on the previously proposed model based on "business function recovery
points" which are a collection of 46 business points of assessment that include human,
technical, and environmental factors that influence recovery times. The proposed model
calculates the Recovery Time Effort (RTE) which Meilani et al. (2019) defines as the total or
summary of efforts required to recover a failed system. Podaras et al. (2021) claim that from
the RTE the RTO can be deduced by anticipating unforeseen circumstances. Because this
approach is proactive in nature, the extent to which unforeseen circumstances can affect a
recovery process is unknown, and the possibilities can be infinite. Also, the model offers a
one-time calculation of this estimate with no provision for future adjustments based on the
history and performance of the organization’s information systems.
2.4.8. Security-Oriented Assessment Framework
The framework proposed by Luo et al. (2020) uses the AHP to determine the
feasibility of the index systems for the perception layer of electric Internet of Things (IoT).
The framework proposes the use of the China Standard in Global Technology GB/T 20988-
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2007 to select RPO and RTO, which is then used to determine the data availability protection
capability of perception layer of electric IoT. The Goubiao National Standard GB/T 209882007 only suggests a relationship between given ranges for both the RTO and RPO but does
not offer a way to derive either metric.
2.4.9. Summary of proposed models
Table 2 is used to present a summary of the proposed models when analyzed using the
following criteria:
a. Business-driven tolerance limit
b. Performance history-based adjustments
c. Objectives and tolerance relationship
d. Sub-system separation of functionality
e. Priority-based recovery decisions
Table 2. Summary of Previous Work
ID.

Model/Solution

Criteria
a b

c

d

e

1

Gap Time Reduction

✓  ✓

 

2

Multi-Objective Scenario-Based Stochastic Robust Optimization

  

 

3

Smart Recovery Advisory

 ✓ 

 

4

Computer Aided Disaster Recovery Planning

  

 

5

Digital Recording Company

✓  

 ✓

6

Indonesia University Study

✓  

✓ 

7

Regression Based Time Prediction

✓  

 ✓

8

Security-Oriented Assessment Framework
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2.5. Conclusion of Literature Review and Research Gap
A review of the existing literature confirmed that there is yet to be a solution that establishes
recovery time and data metrics (RTO and RPO) in a way that either agrees with the
organization’s tolerance limits and technical capabilities or offers a process that factors the
organization’s performance in previous assessments and drills into future decisions. As was
seen earlier in the chapter, some solutions have been offered that improve economic efficiency
in the decision-making process, prioritize organizational interests, and attempt to standardize
their recovery approach. Others have offered models that estimate the recovery time in some
cases, however, the considerations made in the process do not align with the preferences and
concerns as expressed by the surveyed industry practitioners. Therefore, it is appropriate to
conclude that neither prior research efforts nor previously proposed solutions have been aimed
at establishing the metrics with which recovery objectives can be selected, assessed, or
improved using data from a history of the system’s performance.
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CHAPTER 3
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
In this section, the requirements for a proposed solution are explored. The section starts with
a description of the requirements that the potential solution will aim to meet. In the following
sub-sections, relevant existing metrics are reviewed, and their relevance to the proposed
solution is discussed. The section ends with the criteria and expectations of the survey
questionnaire used to determine the rest of the organizational preferences and priorities that the
variables used to develop the proposed solution are based on.

3.1. Solution Goals
The goals that a potential solution to the research problem will aim to meet are drawn directly
from the criteria which were used to assess the previously proposed solutions. These goals are
described below:
•

The ability for an organization’s tolerance limits, both with regards to restoration
time and data loss, to be driven by business requirements in a manner that is
independent of information technology infrastructure and management. This ensures
that the limits of the organization’s tolerance are not biased, and therefore not
influenced by the preferences of the IT department.

•

Periodic adjustments to the recovery objectives facilitated by the organization’s
schedule. This will allow the resulting recovery objectives to adapt to the
organization’s likely performance in a real incident.
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•

A clearly defined relationship between the resulting recovery objectives and the
organization’s defined tolerance limits. The organization can therefore justify the
margin by which the tolerance limit should exceed its recovery objectives

•

The use of separate recovery objectives for each sub-system to allow for isolation of
potential problems or bottlenecks

•

The selection of restore points that protect the organization’s highest priorities even
when it does not agree with the stated objectives.

3.2. Existing Metrics and Theories
The theories and concepts that are widely accepted in incident response and recovery are
commonly used as variables in service continuity planning and are adopted in this research not
only because of their universal acceptability, but also because of their definitive position on the
timeline of cyber incident recovery planning. In the next few sub-sections these concepts are
described.
3.2.1. Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
The Business Impact Analysis is a process, or the result of a process undergone by an
organization to understand the consequences and impact that a given event will have on its
value-creating processes (Taarup-Esbensen, 2020). This analysis defines the organization’s
economic tolerable limits and can be performed in different ways and at different levels.
Depending on the level and scope, it sometimes produces the Maximum Tolerable Downtime
(MTD) (Ruddin, Santoso, Indrajit & Dazki, 2021), and can also produce the Recovery
Objectives (RTO/RPO) (Atiku, Garba & Bade, 2021). In other cases, it utilizes these metrics to
estimate the best- and worst-case scenarios depending on the extent to which the service level
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agreements defined by the recovery objectives are met. In this research, the BIA is referred to
in order to obtain the MTD. Given that information technology staff are likely to have an
incentive to increase the MTD, and for proper separation of responsibilities, it is beneficial for
the BIA to be conducted independent of an organization’s Information Technology department.
3.2.2. Maximum Tolerable Downtime (MTD)
The Maximum Tolerable Downtime as defined by Taarup-Esbensen (2020) is the point
in the future beyond which the organization will no longer be able to sustain itself. This is the
time which the impact of the event begins to have irreparable and unsustainable damage to the
organization’s ability to remain profitable. NIST (2021) also defines this variable or metric as
the total amount of time the system owner/authorizing official is willing to accept for a
mission/business process outage or disruption and includes all impact considerations. NIST
(2021) further states that acknowledging the MTD is important because not doing so could
leave contingency planners with imprecise direction on 1) selection of an appropriate recovery
method, and 2) the depth of detail which will be required when developing recovery procedures,
including their scope and content. Other names that have been used to define this metric are,
Maximum Accepted Outage (MAO) (Suroso, Hamza & Sasongko, 2021) (Nejedlova &
Podaras, 2017) and Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption (MTPD) (Sahebjamnia et al.,
2011).
3.2.3. Backup Frequency
The Backup Frequency defines how often a system is backed up or how often backup
files are created. This cadence is normally defined by the organization according to their
internal standards. In addition, although all frameworks studied by Goud (2019) highlight the
importance of frequent backups, no general standards for the cadence and use of backups are
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proposed. According to Russell and Buffington (2021), a recent study conducted on
preparedness revealed that 56% of backups taken will fail during restoration. The causes of
most data restoration failures include human error, data corruption, and hardware component
failure (Wang, Zhang & Xu, 2017). In another study, Goodwin (2021) reported that 43% of
organizations suffered unrecoverable data in the past 12 months, and 63% of organizations have
suffered a data-related business disruption within the past 12 months. These statistics further
underscore the relevance of the backup frequency and overall backup strategy.

3.3. Survey Questionnaire
In the design and the development of the artifact, to establish and/or validate the variables
used to create the model, a survey was conducted among qualified candidates, and the results
were analyzed using quantitative methods to identify and validate the different pointers and key
factors that are essential to organizations in recovery operations. The following are the criteria
used for the selection of the participants of the survey:
• Have performed organizational duties or held a position in the capacity to make or
contribute to strategic decisions involving cyber incident recovery
• Are between the ages of 25 and 65
The questionnaire used for this survey was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review
Board and was conducted according to the standards of the CITI program’s Research with
Human Subjects (RCR). The results of the survey are presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Due to the nature of this research and the expected outcome, the Design Science research
methodology was used. This methodology would allow for the proposal and evaluation of a
decision model that addresses the research problem directly. Peffers, Rothenberger, Tuunanen
and Vaezi (2012) defined a “model” as a simplified representation of reality documented using
a formal notation or language. According to Wieringa (2014) the artifact produced should
interact with the problem context and aim to improve something in that context. This is
validated along the way to justify its contribution to the research objective.

4.1. Research Processes and Steps
This research was conducted using the six-step process defined by Peffers et al. (2020) for
Design Science Research. The six steps are as follows:
•

Identification of Problem

•

Identification of Research Objectives

•

Design and Development of Artifact

•

Fitment of the artifact with the problem context

•

Evaluation of the artifact to determine utility, rigor, and efficacy

•

Contribution to literature

Fig. 3. illustrates the overall process at a high level.
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Figure 3. Design Science Research Methodology (Peffers et al., 2020)

4.2. Demonstration
To demonstrate how the artifact works, the milestone events of a typical incident are placed
on a timeline which is used to illustrate the relationship between the variables. The illustration
makes use of realistic values for each variable to ensure that the context of the demonstration
is suitable, and that the application of the artifact solved the problem. The illustration is depicted
in Figure 6.

4.3. Evaluation Process
The evaluation of the artifact was conducted in four phases. First, a Numerical Experiment
was conducted using data that is representative of a real-world incident. The numerical
experiment was conducted to test the robustness of the artifact. Next, a Direct Comparison of
the artifact with previously proposed models was made to highlight its differences and ability
to address the research gap. An illustrative scenario based on real world circumstances and
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conditions as described by Wieringa (2014) was used in the following phase. This is due to the
limited availability of details such as cause and effect, preparation level, resource deployment,
and other organizational inner workings related to cyber incidents. Other contributors to the
limited information on cyber incidents according to Romanosky (2016) include the absence of
legislative and regulatory disclosure requirements, and concerns regarding privacy and
organizational interests. To facilitate the demonstration of the artifact’s efficacy, a synthetic
environment was constructed. Finally, the artifact was presented to two experts for review, one
from a technical perspective and the other from a business/financial perspective.
The evaluation of the artifact was intended to demonstrate the three attributes outlined by
Veneble, Bakersville and Pries-Heje (2012) as listed below:
•

Rigor – Shows an observable improvement and works in a real situation

•

Efficiency – Can be performed within resource constraints

•

Ethics – Does not endanger any entities in the process.

Also, due to the synthetic environment and the fact that the evaluation occurred after the
construction of the artifact the evaluation is considered “Artificial” and “Ex-Post” in its nature
(Veneble, Bakersville and Pries-Heje, 2012).
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CHAPTER 5
DECISION MODEL
To address the arising question of how to establish recovery objectives (metrics) in a way
that accounts for an organization’s unique circumstances, the following model is proposed. This
model can be applied to, and further developed for specific circumstances in an IT environment.

5.1. Description of the artifact
5.1.1. Variables
The variables were created using the results from the survey as outlined in the Process
Requirements in Chapter 3.
5.1.2. Survey Responses
The questions in the survey questionnaire to which a total of 67 participants responded
were designed to establish a position in the areas relevant to the research. The participants
were selected from among qualified Information Technology professionals who met the
criteria described in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.
In Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6, the questions sent to the survey participants that are relevant
to the creation of the decision model, along with the responses received showing the
percentages and parameters for each question area are presented. A full list of all the question
presented to the survey participants is available in Appendix C.
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Table 3. Recovery Drills and Metrics
No
2

Question
How often on average does your organization

Percentage

Parameter

70.15

At least twice a

conduct recovery drills?
3

How often do you meet or exceed recovery goals?

year
37.31

Always

76.12

RTO/RPO

87.69

Yes

Percentage

Parameter

85.07

Yes

91.05

Confidentiality/

Table 3. Continued.
5

What Recovery Metrics do you use to measure
success and/or failure to test your recovery
capabilities?
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Does your organization have an official declaration
of disaster and start of the “recovery” clock?

Table 4. AHP Criteria
No
7

Question
Is your organization subject to any regulatory
oversight?

9

Which of the following will a successful cyber-attack
on your organization have the most impact on?

Integrity/
Availability

Table 5. AHP Alternatives
No

Question

14 On a scale of 1-5 (1=Lowest, 5=Highest) how much

Percentage

Parameter

83.08

3 or higher

89.24

3 or higher

33.85

Time of Impact

does “time of failure or breach” matter with regards to
recovery objectives?
15 On a scale of 1-5 (1=Lowest, 5=Highest) how
important is the “time of discovery” of a breach or
failure with regards to recovery objectives?
22 Which of the following does your organization
recognize for the purpose of recovery objectives?
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Table 6. Sub-system Recovery
No

Question

Percentage

Parameter

30.77

Segmented,

11 Which of the following best describes your recovery
process?

Tiered or
Sequential

12 With regards to recovery, how do you best describe the

98.46

Staggered or

relationship between the components or layers of your

Linear

IT environment?
13 If recovery of systems is layered, are there recovery

75.38

Yes

50.77

Separate

objectives/metrics established separately for each
layer, application, or system?
18 Do you have recovery objectives for each
layer/subsystem (i.e., Database, Network,
Applications), or a general set of objectives?

The responses to the survey questionnaire were used to justify the creation of the following
variables which became the foundation of the proposed artifact:
•

RTO1 – Lower limit of the Recovery Time Objective range

•

RTO2 – Upper limit of the Recovery Time Objective range

•

RTO – Recovery Time Objective. The value selected as the target time for recovery
operations

•

RPO – Recovery Point Objective. The value selected as the restore point target for
recovery operations

•

tD – Time of Discovery. The time a breach or incident was first discovered

•

tI – Time of Impact. The time an incident begins to impact an organization’s normal
operations
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•

tB – Time of Breach. The exact time an information system is breached

•

tn – Recovery time for each sub-system. “n” represents the number assigned to the subsystem or layer based on its hierarchy as illustrated in Table 1

•

y – Excess Time. The margin by which recovery for each sub-system exceeds the
established RTO

•

T – Average Excess Time

•

tA – Incident Declaration/Acknowledgement time

•

tP – Timing Priority. Priority selected using AHP to determine the exact restore point.
5.1.3. Existing Metrics

The following variables used in the creation of the proposed model were identified as existing
metrics and theories:
•

F – Backup Frequency (as defined in sub-section 3.2.3)

•

C – Maximum Consecutive Failures. The maximum number of times backups failed
consecutively

•

MTD – Maximum Tolerable Downtime (as defined in sub-section 3.2.2)

•

BIA – Business Impact Analysis (as defined in sub-section 3.2.1).
5.1.4. Technical and Operational Gaps
Based on the technical dependencies among subsystems, the difference between the

RPO and the expected Restore Point due to organizational priorities, and the time difference
between the linear and staggered recovery process, the following variables are created:
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•

Wn – Wait/Pause time for each sub-system. The total time from the beginning of the
recovery operation that recovery of a sub-system is paused to allow for progress on
dependencies.

•

AR – Actual Recovery Target Time. The final restore point selected.

•

∆ – Change. A change in total recovery time when a staggered recovery approach is used.

The expectation was that defining the arithmetic relationship between these variables (except
the times of discovery, impact, and breach) in a manner that avoids overlaps will ensure that
the resulting recovery objectives (RTO and RPO) do not fall outside the tolerable limits.
In the proposed decision model, a choice is made at some point in the process among
tD, tI and tB, using the AHP, of which of the three is of highest importance. In this process,
the goal was to select the right “Timing Priority” which is what determines the incident
acknowledgement or declaration time tA. The Criteria are three of the most common
motivations for establishing recovery metrics which are, regulatory requirements, stakeholder
confidence, and economic impact, as noted by Podofillini, Wolfgang, Bruno and Bozidar
(2015).
5.1.5. Overview and Concept
The proposed decision model is illustrated using the chart presented in Fig. 4. The
process begins with determining the RTO boundaries. These are the upper and lower limits
from within which the RTO can be selected and are represented as RTO2 and RTO1
respectively. The relationship between the upper limit (RTO2) and the MTD is also defined,
and the organization’s performance in recovery assessments is established as an input source
for future updates to the RTO.
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Next, the RPO is defined using the Backup Frequency which is represented as F as a
primary input. It also considers the performance of previous backup operations with regards
to failures. This history is factored into the RPO selection and update process to reflect the
organization’s capabilities, highlight deficiencies, and reduce the chances of unexpected data
loss.
Finally, the appropriate restore point based on the organization’s specific priorities is
determined depending on what the driver of that priority is. This process involves using the
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) with Pair-Wise comparison techniques to select among
alternatives given certain criteria.
Specifics of the artifact will vary from one application to another, as organizational
needs, capabilities, budget, culture, and IT environment differ. However, the principles and
overall concept are repeatable and transferable.
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Figure 4. Decision Model
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5.2. Details of the artifact
In the following steps, a detailed description of how the artifact will work if applied in a typical
IT environment is discussed. It is noteworthy that the application and implementation may vary
depending on specific organizational circumstances.
5.2.1. Defining Restore Time Boundaries – Deriving RTO1
The process for setting the RTO range involves identifying two boundaries which
form the RTO range. In this model, the RTO is not a single metric but rather a variable that
falls within the range defined by a maximum (RTO2) and a minimum (RTO1) limit. Both
values are calculated independently. The first step in the model is to determine the value of
RTO1 which is given by an aggregate or sum of the recovery times of all the sub-systems.
A distinction is made between systems that are recovered in a “linear” fashion, which
is where the recovery of one sub-system must be completed before work on the next one in
the hierarchy is started, or if a “staggered” approach is used where recovery of several
subsystems can be started simultaneously. If the recovery process is linear then RTO1 is
calculated as follows:
𝑅𝑇𝑂1 = ∑5𝑛=1 𝑡𝑛

(3)

If the approach for deploying recovery resources is not linear, and work can start on different
parts of the system simultaneously, then based on the inter-dependencies among the
subsystems or layers, the total time saved by starting work simultaneously is calculated as
“Change” ∆ and deducted from the total of all recovery times to obtain RTO1. This is
achieved in two steps:
a)

Calculate the total time saved, or change in time (∆) using the formula in equation 4:
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∑4𝑛=1 𝑡𝑛 − (𝐸𝑛−1 − 𝑤𝑛 )
b)

(4)

Deduct the results in step a) from the sum of all recovery times using the formula below:
Σ 𝑡𝑛 − ∆

(5)

The results of the above becomes the RTO1 for a system where a staggered approach is used.
To test its validity, RTO1 is compared with the MTD. In this model, it is suggested
that the MTD is obtained from the organization’s Business Impact Analysis as TaarupEsbensen (2020) and Ruddin et al. (2021) noted. If RTO1 is smaller than the MTD, it becomes
the lower limit of the RTO range. If it is larger than the MTD, it is recognized as a risk and
the appropriate treatment is applied (Samimi, 2020). National Institute of Standards and
Technology (2011) defines the risk treatment activities as follows:
•

Acceptance – The risk is accepted and documented, usually if the cost-benefit analysis
is not in favor of any other treatment

•

Avoidance – The entire activity is avoided. This treatment would not be applicable if
there is a requirement to establish valid recovery objectives

•

Mitigation – The risk is addressed directly to eliminate or reduce it, and

•

Transference – The consequences of the risk are transferred or shared with another
entity (NIST, 2011).
5.2.2. Defining Restore Time Boundaries – Deriving RTO2
The upper limit or maximum value of the RTO range (RTO2) is established by

defining a direct relationship with the MTD.
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Another variable used in the calculation of RTO2 is the Average Excess Time denoted
by T. During recovery drills or actual incidents, as established in the results of the survey,
many organizations exceed their RTOs. This model proposes that the MTD should exceed
RTO2 by a minimum of the average margin by which the RTO has been exceeded during
these drills. In this model, the “Excess Time” variable, denoted as “y,” defines the margin by
which the recovery time for each system in a drill or event exceeds the RTO. Therefore, RTO2
is expressed as follows:
𝑅𝑇𝑂2 = 𝑀𝑇𝐷 − 𝑇
where T =

𝟏
𝒏

∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝒚𝒊

(6)
(7)

Although noted by Podaras, Klara and Jiri (2016), recovery drills are presupposed in
organizational recovery planning strategy. However, if a drill or assessment has not been
conducted, and this model is being applied in the first attempt at establishing recovery
objectives, then RTO1 can be used as the RTO. Once both limits of the RTO range have been
identified, they will define the limits from within which the RTO can then be safely selected.
To confirm that the selected RTO is within safe limits, the model proposes verifying
that RTO2 is greater or equal to the selected RTO, and also that the selected RTO is greater or
equal to RTO1 as expressed in equation 8.
𝑅𝑇𝑂2 ≥ 𝑅𝑇𝑂 ≥ 𝑅𝑇𝑂1

(8)

5.2.3. Defining The Restore Point – Deriving RPO
Due to the complexity of the compression algorithms used in backup operations, they
are prone to frequent failures (Russell & Buffington, 2021). This model proposes that the
RPO should be greater than the Backup Frequency and should also consider the number of

39
times the creation of reliable backup copies was not successful. This consideration can be
done either with reference to the organization’s own history, or external statistical data.
The model further proposes that for the RPO, the Backup Frequency or Cadence
denoted as F is multiplied by the number of consecutive times a backup operation has failed
to produce usable backup data, as acknowledged by Russell and Buffington (2021), which is
denoted as C, and added to the value of F. This guarantees that there is one copy of the
backup for when there is no failure and at least one iteration of the backup to compensate for
each possibility of a failure based on the system’s history. The resulting formula for
calculating the RPO is expressed in equation 9.
𝑅𝑃𝑂 = 𝐹 + (𝐶𝐹)

(9)

Multiplying the number of consecutive failures with the backup frequency accounts for the
possibility that the backups could fail that same number of times, and adding it to another
instance of the backup frequency allows the recovery operation to go back one more cycle due
to the lack of availability of data resulting from consecutive failures. The relationship between
these variables and metrics is illustrated in Fig. 6.
5.2.4. Defining The Restore Point – Setting the Actual Recovery Target Time
The model concludes with a third variable defined as Actual Recovery Target Time
denoted as AR. AR defines the restore point to which recovery operations should be targeted
and explores its relationship with the RPO. The process begins with properly timing the
incident by determining whether the time of breach tB, the time of impact tI or time of
discovery tD is of the highest priority to the organization. This decision is usually influenced
by such things as organization culture, regulatory requirements, and the economic impact of
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the incident, as confirmed using data from the survey. The model proposes the use of the
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to make this selection.
The proposed Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is the tool used to make the
selection based on the organization’s culture, preferences, and circumstances among the three
variables, tI, tD, and tB. This selection is based on one of three criteria that most closely
aligns with the primary motivations for setting recovery objectives. From the results of the
survey that was conducted to determine organizational preferences and concerns, the criteria
used in the AHP selection process were identified as “Regulatory Requirement,” “Economic
Impact,” and “Organization Principle/Culture.” Figure 5 illustrates the structure and specific
application of AHP.

Figure 5. AHP Model

In the next step, another decision is made. The established RPO is compared to the
time determined by the incident timing priority tP using AHP. If the RPO exceeds or is earlier
than the established incident timing denoted as tP in the model, then recovery can be targeted
to the time established by the RPO. On the other hand, if the RPO is later than the time
established by tP, then an hour before the value established by tP is selected in lieu of the
RPO as the recovery target time, and can then suffice as the reason or explanation for not
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meeting the RPO. The rationale behind the extra hour is to place AR at a time earlier than the
value of tP in which case the last available and reliable backup data will be used for the
restoration.
5.2.5. Summary
Based on the relationship between the MTD and the RTO, and that between the RPO
and Backup Frequency F, two different formulae are proposed to derive these metrics
objectively in such a way that ensures no overlaps, and is both repeatable and adaptable. The
relationships are expressed as follows:
RTO1 ≥ RTO ≤ RTO2 < MTD
RPO = F + (C × F)

5.3. Timeline Illustration
The next few sections show how each of the variables are derived and in what calculations
they are used. In Fig. 6, sample numbers are used to graphically illustrate the relationship
between the variables on a timeline.

Figure 6. Incident Timeline

In the example presented in Fig. 6, an incident occurs and is declared at 12 noon [which is the
tA] at an organization with an MTD of 4 hours. In this example, it takes about 1 hour to restore
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all systems, and in the past the organization has exceeded this time by an average of 1 hour.
Based on this, the feasible RTO for the organization is between 1 and 3 hours.
The RPO on the other hand is calculated at 3 hours even though a backup is taken every hour.
The additional time comes from the history of backup failures. The figure reflects that there have
been about 2 consecutive backup failures in the recent past. Point x is the appropriate restore
point if there were no failures. Point y and z are the restore points if there had been 1 or 2
consecutive failures respectively. This assures that the restore point established by the selected
RPO accounts for the risk of a backup failure.
The RPO should be dependent on the Backup Frequency. This provides the assurance that the
RPO is not set outside of the capabilities of the system and resources. Testing a system’s
recoverability and recovery capabilities using correct, feasible and realistic metrics paint a more
accurate picture of what the likely results will be in the event of an actual incident.
Depending on what the motivation for setting recovery objectives and metrics is, in the event
of an actual incident where system recovery becomes necessary, an organization must decide
what point to recover the systems to. If the Time of Breach tB which is the time the system got
compromised is more important to the organization, then recovery should be targeted to an
earlier time to ensure that the status of the compromised system is not carried over into the
recovered system. If the time when the incident begins to impact the organization (Time of
Impact ‘tI’), or the time the incident is discovered (Time of Discovery ‘tD’) is more of a priority
to the organization, then the system should be recovered to a time that reflects this preference.
The time the system is recovered to is recognized in this model as the Actual Recovery Target
Time (AR) which can then be expressed as follows:
If

(RPO > tP)
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Else

𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑃𝑂

(10)

𝐴𝑅 = 𝑡𝑃 − 1

(11)

In the above expression, if the calculated RPO is greater than the Time of Impact, Discovery,
or Breach [depending on the organization’s priorities,] then AR is equal to the RPO. If this is
not the case, then the AR should reflect the organization’s priorities with regards to timing the
incident as well as the available recovery data.
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CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION
The artifact was evaluated to test its ability to address the research problem and attain the
research goal if implemented. As stated earlier, Wieringa (2014) describes Artifact Evaluation
as the process of investigating the effects of an interaction between the artifact and a model of
the problem context. Based on this interaction and its effects, a “design theory” was constructed
for the purpose of predicting the effect of the implementation of the artifact in a real-world
scenario. Wieringa (2014) describes design theory as a theory of the properties of the artifact
and its interaction with the problem context.
The Evaluation then concluded using four different methods to validate the usefulness and
efficacy of the artifact. First, a numerical experiment was conducted to demonstrate how the
artifact can be used to define the parameters for the selection of recovery objectives based on
the system’s performance. Secondly, a direct comparison of the artifact’s features and those of
other previously proffered models was done to highlight the differences. Thirdly, the artifact
was applied in an illustrative scenario using real world data, and the result of that application
was validated based on the available data. Finally, the artifact was presented to two experts,
both of whom participated in the initial survey. One of the experts gave a review of the artifact
from a technical perspective, and the other gave a review from a business process and operations
perspective.

6.1. Numerical Experiment
The environment for the Numerical Experiment was designed using experimental
hypothetical data that is representative of a real-world context. This is due, both to the limited

45
availability of real-world data and the amount of time and resources that would be required for
a real-world experiment.
In the scenario used for this evaluation, the organization is an energy and utilities company
that is regulated by the North American Energy Reliability Commission (NERC) which requires
that an organization identify when the incident is first detected (Baham, Calderon &
Hirschheim, 2017). In the scenario, the MTD is determined in the BIA to be 6 hours, and the
organization conducts recovery drills every quarter, which exceeds the annual requirements as
outlined by (Baham et al., 2017). Table 7 shows the recovery times that were presumed each
time the recovery drills were conducted over the past year. In Table 7 each Period equals one
quarter of the year, and the four quarters are represented by Q1 – Q4.
Table 7. Recovery Drills History
Period

Total Recovery Times (hr.)

Q1

6

Q2

5.5

Q3

4

Q4

5

The organization in the scenario backs up its systems and data every hour and has had three
consecutive backup failures in the last twelve backup cycles. It also indicated that based on
regulatory requirements, the time an incident is discovered is of higher priority than either the
time it begins to have serious impact or the time the system was breached. The organization
also indicated that the time of impact was of the lowest priority.
According to the scenario, on a given day, the IT staff reported for work at 7:30 am, and at
8:00 am some indicators of compromise were noticed. Some server names had been changed
and there was unusual outbound network traffic. At 10:00 am, users began reporting that some
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critical applications and services were either unavailable or running slow. Their IT team
launched an investigation, and forensic evidence indicated that malware had entered the IT
environment at 6:00 am. The investigation also concluded that despite their vulnerability and
susceptibility to injection-based attacks as described by Xu and Qian (2015) no external
supporting network infrastructure was impacted.
As part of the design theory and for this evaluation, variables are provided in the table below
for the recovery times for each of the subsystems of the IT infrastructure. At this point in the
scenario, recovery objectives have not previously been established and the numbers in Table 8
are obtained from the IT department’s estimate in their playbooks and runbooks.
Table 8. Recovery Data for Subsystems
Assigned Variable

Subsystem

Recovery Time

Wait Time (hr.)

(hr.)
t1

Storage

1

N/A

t2

Compute

2

0

t3

Network

1.5

1

t4

Database

1

2

t5

Application

2

2.5

6.1.1. Recovery Time
For the Recovery Time Objective, the model proposes setting boundaries within which
a valid RTO can be selected. To define these boundaries, an organization’s best capabilities
define the lower limit of the range (RTO1), and its performance in the most recent drills or
assessments is used to define the upper limit (RTO2).
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Using the data from the scenario, the RTO for a “linear” recovery process where the
recovery of one subsystem must be completed before the next one begins is calculated using
equation 3 as follows:
RTO1 = ∑5𝑛=1 𝑡𝑛
= (1 + 2 + 1.5 + 1 + 2) hrs.
= 7.5 hrs.

The Linear recovery process produces a minimum RTO of 7.5 hours which is greater
than the MTD of 6 hours. A graphical representation is presented in Fig. 7.

Figure 7. Linear Recovery Process

Using the same data from table 8, if a “staggered” recovery process is used, recovery
of each subsystem can be performed simultaneously where applicable. However, due to
technical dependencies, finalization of the recovery of a subsystem can only be completed
after recovery of the preceding subsystem has been completed and tested. This gives rise to
the wait/pause times denoted by W. RTO2 is thus calculated by deducting the sum of the
wait/pause times of each subsystem from the elapsed recovery time of the previous subsystem
denoted by E and summing the results as expressed in equation 5.
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The first step in calculating the RTO is to calculate the total change using equation 4
as follows:
4

∆ = ∑𝑛=1 (𝐸𝑛−1 – 𝑤𝑛 )
= (3 – 2.5) + (2.5 – 2) + (2 – 1) + (1 – 0)
= 3 hrs.

In the next step, to obtain the total recovery time using the staggered process, the change
in time (∆) is deducted from the sum of all individual recovery times.
RTO1 = 7.5 hrs. – 3hrs.
= 4.5 hrs.

Based on the above, the total recovery time and therefore Recovery Objective is 4.5 hrs.
This is illustrated in Fig. 8.

Figure 8. Staggered Recovery Process

In the above demonstration, an assumption is made that the organization did not
previously have an RTO and was attempting to create one for the first time. The results show
that if a linear or sequential recovery process is used, the RTO would be calculated as 7.5
hours, in which case, additional attention should be paid to reduce it as it exceeds the MTD.
However, if the organization used a staggered recovery method, the resulting RTO would be
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4.5 hours which is less than the MTD, and depending on the organization’s preferences,
further action might not be required. This also means that the organization will not have a
value for the upper limit of the RTO range (RTO2) at this point. The process for deriving this
value is demonstrated next.
If the organization uses a staggered recovery approach as presented in the second
example, the value for the average excess time denoted by T is derived by calculating the
average of the Excess Times denoted by y. This then becomes the margin by which the
Maximum Tolerable Downtime should exceed the RTO. As expressed in equation 6 this is
calculated as follows:
T = (y1 + y2 + y3 + y4) ÷ 4
= (1.5 + 1 + 0 + 0.5) ÷ 4
=3÷4
= 0.75
It is noteworthy that the recovery time for Q3 is set to zero as it does not constitute an
“overage” or an instance where the RTO is exceeded. This is because the Total Recovery
Time for this period (4 hours) is less than the established RTO (4.5 hours). Further, it is
shown that the recovery times for each sub-system exceed the established RTO by an average
of 0.75 hours. This means that the upper limit or maximum value of the RTO (RTO2) is
calculated as follows, using equation 6:
MTD – T
= 6 hours – 0.75 hours
= 5.25 hours
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Based on the above example, the range to safely establish the RTO is between 4.5 hrs.
and 5.25 hrs. This demonstrates that if the RTO is set to a value below 4.5 hours, the objective
is not likely to be met. Similarly, if it is set to a value higher than 5.25 hours, there is a greater
risk of exceeding the MTD putting the organization in greater proximity of the risk defined in
the BIA.
6.1.2. Recovery Point
The first step in establishing the RPO was to obtain the Backup Frequency F and the
Maximum Consecutive Failure C variables from the backup schedule. Using this information,
and based on the given scenario, the RPO was calculated as defined in equation (7), as
follows:
RPO = FC + F
= 3 hours + 1 hours
= 4 hours
Being that the RPO is only an objective and not an actual representation of the system’s
capabilities, in the event of a failure, it is expected that the system could be restored to any
point in time that is less than or equal to the 4 hours preceding the acknowledgement time of
12 pm in the scenario. During this evaluation, the proposal on how to establish the RPO
presented a new challenge which required determining the process of acknowledgement of the
incident. This was an essential element in the determination of the RPO because it sets the
starting point from which to work backwards.
As organizations differ in how they acknowledge and address incidents, due to the
influence the time of acknowledgement has on the recovery objectives, three variables were
established and reaffirmed as viable options for making the distinction. The decision model
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further proposes the use of a multicriteria decision process to select which of these three
valuables is best suited for the organization’s needs, and then base the “Actual Recovery
Target Time,” which is the time the systems and data are recovered to, on the selected option.
Using the process illustrated in Fig. 5 along with Pairwise Comparison techniques, an
exact priority time for the incident can be derived and recognized by the organization. This
value becomes the basis for determining the Actual Recovery Target Time AR and justifying a
stray from the RPO if necessary.
To perform the Pair-Wise Comparison for the three alternatives based on the
organization’s responses according to the scenario, the following scale of relative importance
is constructed using Saaty’s method (Saaty, 1987). Tables 9, 10 and 11 present the Scale of
Relative Importance, Pair Wise Comparison details, and the Normalized Pair Wise
Comparison respectively.
Table 9. Scale of Relative Importance
Alternative

Value

Description

tI

1

Equal Importance

tB

3

Strong Importance

tD

5

Extreme Importance

N/A

2, 4

Intermediate Values

Table 10. Pair Wise Comparison
tI

tD

tB

tI

1

1/5 = 0.2

1/3 = 0.33

tD

5

1

1/3 = 0.33
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Table 10 - Continued
tB

3

3/5 = 0.6

1

Sum

9

1.8

3

Table 11. Normalized Pair Wise Comparison
tI

tD

tB

Weights

tI

1/9 = 0.11

0.2/1.8 – 0.11

0.33/3 = 0.11

0.33/3 = 0.11

tD

5/9 = 0.56

1/1.8 = 0.56

1.66/3 = 0.55

1.67/3 = 0.56

tB

3/9 = 0.33

0.6/1.8 = 0.33

1/3 = 0.33

0.99/3 = 0.33

From the above analysis, the time of discovery tD has the highest weight and therefore
will be used to determine the target recovery point AR.
To demonstrate how this would work in the real world, the same scenario presented in
the evaluation of the Recovery Point is used. In this scenario, the system is breached at 6:00
am, the breach is discovered at 8:00 am, and the system begins to lose functionality at 10:00
am. Using the organization’s priority in incident recognition as computed with the AHP, and
the RPO as inputs, the actual recovery target time AR was calculated for each of the three
possible outcomes.
From the decision model, three different calculations were made to determine whether
the RPO placed the recovery target time earlier than the three possible values of the incident
acknowledgement priority. In the cases where the RPO landed at a later time, the time
determined by the Incident Priority time was reduced by one hour to establish a value for AR
that was earlier and would therefore satisfy the organization’s recovery priorities.
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6.2. Direct Comparison
In the second part of the evaluation, a direct comparison of the artifact with the previously
proposed models and solutions is done to highlight the differences and the features of the
artifact that have so far not been offered previously. Table 12 below is used to illustrate:
Table 12. Direct Comparison
Solution

Business

Performance

Objectives/

Sub-

Priority

Driven

Based

Tolerance

system

Based

Tolerance

Adjustments Relationship Separation Decisions

Gap time Reduction

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Multi-Objective

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Scenario-Based
Stochastic
Optimization

Smart Recovery
Advisor

Computer Aided
Disaster Recovery
Planning

Digital Recording
Company

Indonesia University
Study
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Table 12 - Continued
Regression Based

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Prediction

Security -Oriented
Assessment
Framework

Our Model

6.3. Illustrative Scenario (real-world data)
The evaluation method employed in this part of the evaluation is Illustrative Scenario.
Peffers, Rothenberger, Tuunanen and Vaezi (2012) defined this as the application of an
artifact to a synthetic or real-world situation aimed at illustrating the rigor and suitability or
utility of the artifact. Data from two recent independent global studies were used to create a
context in which the artifact was applied. The results were then compared with suggestions
made in a third study.
Russell and Buffington (2021), in a recent study found that 58% of recovery
operations from backups fail due to a combination of failed backups and failed restore
capabilities. Goodwin (2021) also found that the average backup schedule has a backup
frequency of 24 hours. Given these two data points, the number of failed backups that can be
assumed in a two-week period is calculated as follows:
58%×14 = 8.12

≅8
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With approximately 8 failed backups in a two-week period, even with the most even
distribution of those failures, the minimum number of consecutive failures is 2. This means
that if the artifact is applied in the same context in which both studies were conducted, the
RPO would be calculated as follows using equation 9:
RPO = FC + F
= (24×2) + 24
= 48 + 24
= 72 (3 days)

6.4. Results
6.4.1. Numerical Experiment

In the first part of the evaluation, the RTO range was calculated. This was illustrated
as the range between the values of RTO1 and RTO2. Using a Linear recovery process results
in a longer overall recovery time. In the evaluation, this caused the recovery time to exceed
the MTD and the conflict was immediately obvious. Switching to the staggered method
produced a lower minimum RTO1 value. Table 13 is used to illustrate the results, and all
values are expressed in hours.
Table 13. RTO Final Analysis
MTD

RTO1

Margin

RTO2

Range

Linear

6

7.5

-1.5

-

-

Staggered

6

4.5

1.5

5

0.5

N/A

3

-

-

-

Change
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The results in Table 13 show a positive change of 3 hours in the value of RTO1
moving from a linear to a staggered method. It also shows a range of 0.75 hours (4.5 hours to
5.25 hours) within which the RTO can be selected. This means that an RTO no less than 4.5
hours and no more than 5.25 hours can be safely used.
The second part of the numerical experiment tested the process for establishing a
reliable recovery point. In this part of the test, two variables were realized, the RPO and the
AR. The RPO of 4 hours was achieved by multiplying the highest consecutive number of
backup failures C by the backup frequency F and adding a single value of the backup
frequency F to the result. This demonstrates that the system can be expected to be restored
using the most recent backup if there were no failures, and that every additional consecutive
failure creates additional risk of not having a reliable backup with which to restore the system.
Consideration of this risk was used to justify moving the RPO further backwards on the
recovery timeline.
The Actual Restore Point was determined by using the multicriteria decision process
AHP to select an incident timing priority on the timeline. This was used to determine the
specific recovery target time. In the demonstration above, the incident discovery time tD had
the highest priority and was used to determine the actual restore point. This means that AR
will be resolved to one hour earlier than the time of discovery, which is 7:00 am.
6.4.2. Comparison with Similar Work
In the next part of the evaluation, the decision model was compared to previously
proposed models identified in the literature review. The results demonstrated the decision
model’s efficacy in the five assessment areas. A brief discussion of its applicability and utility
is presented in the sub-sections below.
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Business Driven Tolerance Limit
The artifact features a step in which the organization’s maximum tolerance limit is
obtained directly from the BIA to establish the MTD, and not created as part of its
functionality. Obtaining this value from an entity outside the IT department ensures that there
is no bias or preferential considerations made in the process. Testing the organization’s
capabilities against this threshold also increases the quality and reliability of the results.
Performance-based Adjustments
The selection of recovery objectives is usually the responsibility of an organization’s
Information Technology leadership, except when other departments are affected in one way or
the other, whereby a collaboration with the affected departments might become necessary. An
organization’s success or failure in system recovery activities is largely based on their ability
to meet their recovery objectives. Therefore, adjusting them accordingly, with input from the
details that reflect the organization’s recent performance in assessments, allows the
organization to align its decisions with its capabilities.
To satisfy this, the proposed decision model features the reuse of data from recovery
assessments and drills to calculate the “buffer” between the upper limit of the RTO (RTO2)
and the MTD. Similarly, in determining the RPO, the decision model factors the
“consecutive” backup failures into the likelihood that reliable backup data will be available
and allows for the adjustment of the RTO based on that.
Objectives and Tolerance Relationship
Clarifying the arithmetic relationship between the recovery objectives and the
organization’s tolerance limits with regards to recovery time will help ensure that the
tolerance limits such as the MTD will not be exceeded (Kawaguchi, 2013), and that recovery
can be completed in a timeframe less than the MTD (Taarup-Esbensen, 2020). In a previous
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model proposed by Kawaguchi (2013), the “gap time” between the “Current Recovery Time
(CRT)” and the MTD is used to determine the RTO. This forced a focus on the relationship
between the CRT and the RTO. Other proposals offer the MTD and RTO as products of the
BIA but offer no succinct selection process.
The proposed model improves the process by using a system’s performance and
history relating to recovery time to estimate the likelihood and extent to which a recovery
time target might be exceeded, and selecting an RTO that reflects this estimation, thereby
redirecting the focus, if necessary, on the MTD and RTO relationship.
Sub-system Separation of Functionality
Taarup-Esbensen

(2020)

acknowledges

the

importance

of

identifying

the

interdependencies’ critical processes, as well as recognizing their recovery times separately.
Principles such as separation of duties and responsibilities can give rise to this in some
organizations. In the survey that was conducted to establish organizations’ priorities 44.78% of
the participants confirmed that their organizations have different recovery objectives for each
subsystem. In the context of cyber incident recovery, and in view of the fact that different types
of cyber-attacks target and impact different sub-systems, a separate but similar set of recovery
objectives can thus be justified.
Priority-based recovery decisions
Recognition of the organization’s priorities as proposed by the model is based on the
three criteria identified as influential in the organization’s decision-making process regarding
response and recovery from cyber incidents. These criteria were also confirmed in the survey
questionnaire as outlined in the Process Requirements chapter.
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6.4.3. Illustrative Scenario
The artifact was applied in an illustrative scenario based on real world data, and the
resulting minimum RPO was 3 days (72 hours). This is based on an average 24-hour backup
frequency and a 58% backup failure rate. This result is also confirmed by the data presented
by Thomas et al. (2018) shown in table 14, which is based on NIST SP 800-30. This means
that, as confirmed by the application of the artifact and confirmed by Thomas et al. (2018),
the average RPO for most organizations should be around 3 hours. Although the
demonstration resulted in a 3-hour RPO, based on the design of the artifact, its
recommendation for recovery objectives is flexible and can change, based on the performance
of the system.
Table 14. Information Security Assessment Backup Evaluation Guide
1

2

3

Backup
Factor

General
Guidance

Success Criteria

Backup
Paradigm

Does the backup
paradigm allow
full point-in-time
restores?

The system must be
able to restore fully to
the previous state on a
given day.

RPO
Capability

How far back
can the backup
system create a
previous state?

Minimal = 3 days,
Conservative = 14
days, Aggressive = 21
days

Backup
Server Access

Who can access
the backup
server?

Only backup
administrators or those
with legitimate need
should be able to
access

Backup
Server
Network
Connections

Which systems
can be connected
to the backup
system?

The backup systems
should be isolated, and
only systems with need
should be able to be
connected.

4

5

Findings Recommendations
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Table 14 - Continued
Backup
Server
Storage

Can the backup
storage systems
be shared?

Backup system storage
system sharing should
be limited. Other
systems should not be
used as a “bridge”
where unintended users
can write to the backup
systems.

Note. From “Improving Backup Systems Evaluations in Information Security Risk
Assessments to Combat Ransomware,” by J. Thomas and G. C. Galligher, 2018, Computer
and Information Science CCSENET Journal 11(1), p.23 (https://doi.org/10.5539/cls.v11n1p14
6.4.4. Expert Opinion
In the fourth and final part of the evaluation expert opinion was sought from two
experts for review and evaluation. One gave a technical perspective and the other gave a
business process perspective. The expert who provided the technical evaluation is experienced
in the field of disaster recovery and incident response planning and has worked in several
global organizations in leadership capacity providing consultative and advisory oversight at
the organizational leadership level. Below is the statement issued after the evaluation:
Few will deny that digital resilience is today, in fact, business resilience.
Digitally resilient organizations will continue to provide service to customers and
stakeholders in the event of an interruption to normal operations including the
business being affected by a “disaster.” Digitally resilient organizations maintain
reputation and competitiveness in spite of being impacted by today’s disasters which
are primarily cyber incidents.

61
Organizational efforts to achieve resilience fail mainly because business and
technology have difficulty establishing common goals to establish, fund, and maintain
appropriate organizational disaster recovery responses. In simple practice,
organizations typically established a single point RTO and RPO, conducted a test, and
waited for a readiness grade based upon those two factors.
The proposed model with its ability to establish multiple views of RTO and
RPO will foster more open engagement between business and technology as it can be
used to be more effective in relating to actual business operating requirements. By
doing so, business and technology can better understand the organizational resilience
requirements and establish effective recovery workbooks. Preparation for the
ubiquitous threat to any organization requires a high level of understanding and
active collaboration between business and technology.
This new model provides a new and flexible approach for collaboration. The
traditional and staggered recovery approaches can be managed to set a course for
technology to recover the business organization flexibly as it responds to cyber
incidents and assures organizational resilience.

The second expert evaluation was given from a business process perspective with
financial considerations. The expert who performed the review is proficient in finance and
enterprise performance and has operated in that capacity for over twelve years. The following
statement was issued as part of the evaluation:
After thorough review of the proposed artifact, I believe that it will be highly
impactful if implemented in a real-world setting. If implemented, a trigger / alert
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would go to the financial team once the established system restore time exceeds the
defined business limits for acceptable financial loss. Consequently, consideration can
be made to reconcile financial and technical details to eliminate possible conflicts.
If implemented correctly in an organizational recovery planning process, the
artifact appears to have features that will make collaboration efforts between the
Information Technology Department and the Business Process office more productive
and agreeable. The recovery objectives produced or validated by this process have a
strong dependency on the system’s previous record of performance. This relationship
verifies that the recovery objectives are a better reflection of how the organization is
likely to perform in a real incident.
For this reason, adjustments made to operational activities related to recovery
are likely to be good for incident recovery preparation. I believe that acceptance of
this process will be high among any organization’s executives, as it eliminates the
“guess work” that is often involved with generating recovery objectives. Also, I
believe it represents a good start in the standardization of the process for establishing
recovery objectives.

6.5. Evaluation Summary
The variables relevant for the evaluation and their respective values are summarized
and presented in figure 9. The shaded boxes are the selected values for each variable as
applied in the evaluation of the artifact.
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Figure 9. Variables and values. Evaluation of DSR artifacts (Cleven et al., 2009)

6.6. Discussion
To address the problem of normalizing and standardizing the process of selecting
recovery objectives as identified in the research problem, a decision model was proposed to
provide guidance and standardize the process. The artifact was evaluated in an illustrative
scenario where it was applied to a synthetic environment to demonstrate its utility and
efficacy. The results of the evaluation were as expected. The values realized for the RTO and
RPO were verifiably within the organization’s tolerable limits and their relationship with
other metrics involved in the overall recovery planning were clearly established.
The scenario presented a cyber incident that was announced by the organization at
12:00pm. The RPO was calculated at 4 hours, which initially placed the recovery target time
at 8:00 am. Given that the RPO is only a goal, this indicated that the organization, with the
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availability of reliable recovery data, could have recovered their systems to a restore point
later than 8:00am but not any earlier. Furthermore, based on the reporting requirements in
NERC (2019) which placed the “time of discovery” at the highest priority, it would be
advisable for the organization to select an earlier restore point. In this case, the organization
would not be said to have met their recovery point objective. This is due to the time lag
between when the incident was discovered and when it was acknowledged and reported.
Organizations usually conduct internal investigations to validate the incident details,
gather all relevant information, and deem the incident reportable. In this scenario, with a
shorter time lag between incident discovery and incident acknowledgement the organization
would have met its recovery point objective.
In selecting the upper and low limits for the RTO range, using a Linear or Sequential
restoration process where each sub-system is restored only after the previous one in the
sequence has been completed, resulted in a longer total restoration time. In the given scenario,
this total time exceeded the MTD, and would have prompted a revisit of the overall recovery
and risk assessment process. When the Staggered recovery approach was used, and recovery
activities on different subsystems can begin simultaneously, a shorter recovery time was
recorded. This demonstrated that moving from the Linear approach to the Staggered approach
can decrease the total recovery time, and therefore, where applicable, this might be a strategy
to reduce the total recovery time. However, due to requirements such as separation of duties,
or budget constraints in smaller organizations, resources or flexibility required to facilitate a
Staggered approach might be limited or unavailable.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Organizations benefit greatly from planning ahead for cyber incidents. In some cases,
such planning can save the organization itself from a total collapse following a disaster. After
evaluating the artifact produced in this research to answer the research question, it is evident
that developing recovery objectives around an organization’s technical and operational
capabilities reduces the risk posed by unrealistic and non-feasible recovery goals. In this
research, the objective was to find a way that the popular and widely accepted recovery
metrics (RTO and RPO) can be established within an organization’s tolerable limits and
capabilities. Results from the survey showed that many organizations still prefer to use these
metrics over others to test for cyber incident recovery readiness. These results further
underscore the need to align these objectives to an organization’s specific circumstances.
In establishing the RTO, two different requirements had to be satisfied. The first was
to ensure that the RTO is equal to or larger than the time required to recover all systems
(RTO1). The second was to ensure that the RTO is less than or equal to a value (RTO2) which
is less than the tolerable limit (MTD) by a margin equal to or greater than the average margin
of failure. For the RTO, the boundaries of the “safe” range were defined as RTO1 and RTO2.
The “distance” between these two variables became the range within which the RTO can be
safely established, making it easier to logically argue against setting the RTO outside this
range. For the RPO, using the history of consecutive failures to justify the expansion of the
value of the backup cadence or frequency showed that if the organization fared according to
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its history during a severe event, the expectations set by the value of the RPO will be within
reason.
From the survey also, it was learned that majority of organizations have a formal
declaration process for acknowledging cyber incidents. This declaration usually contains a
recognition time upon which the recovery metrics are based. This time differs however from
the acknowledgement time denoted by tA in the decision model. tA is the time of
acknowledgement which is usually reported as part of the declaration. It was also found that
regardless of what “incident timing” was adopted, the relationship with the RPO remained the
same. This means that the Actual Recovery Target Time would remain the same as the RPO
unless the recovery point defined by the RPO was later than that defined by the company’s
preferred incident timing, in which case the Actual Recovery Target Time is a time earlier
than the priority time for the incident, reduced by one hour to compensate for any margin of
error.

7.1. Limitations and Challenges
In the course of the research, from the identification and validation of the problem to
the design and evaluation of the proposed solution, several limitations and challenges were
encountered. The most profound of these was the lack of availability of specific details from
actual real-world incidents. Data from an incident such as whether drills were being
conducted, what the results of those drills were, backup schedules and failure rates, selected
recovery objectives, and BIA details are not readily available publicly due to privacy, legal,
and in some cases, regulatory concerns. Another major challenge was the length of time it
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would take to completely assess the full impact of implementing the artifact. Assumptions, as
detailed in sub-section 1.5, had to be made in order to predict the outcome.

7.2. Contributions
The findings of this research can be used to improve assessments of an organization’s
recovery preparation, particularly the feasibility of its recovery metrics. Attention can be
drawn to other factors that contribute to recovery metrics in general, especially those that have
little or no dependency on the IT department, such as the MTD. This can be especially useful
in audits and other circumstances where regulatory oversight is necessary. As shown in the
model, the meeting of, or failure to meet certain conditions can trigger or influence the
employment of resources to improve some key components of a backup operation, thereby
contributing to the overall cyber risk management process. Other possible uses of the decision
model include a demonstration of due diligence and objectivity in internal self-assessment.

7.3. Future Research Direction
Future research efforts under this topic may seek to explore the relationship between
the RTO and RPO as both are a reference to a point in time. Decisions on whether the very
meaning of the RPO should be redefined as a function of the RTO as the “time” factor affects
both increasingly, depending on the organization’s business operations. Specifically, research
efforts to further this study can aim to understand the following:
7.3.1. Related to the Decision Model
• How the model can be applied to fit an organization’s specific circumstances such as time
of high activity vs time of low or no activity to optimize targeted recovery
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• What the tolerable limits could be for data loss expectancy and how to make such
determination with reference to quantity of data as opposed to time
• Opportunities for automation and further customization of the decision model to fit
specific environments
• How to determine the amount of data to be considered from system performance history
• Integration of this decision model into performance management and other capability
management programs.
7.3.2. General System and Data Recovery
• The reasons why organizations might use a linear recovery approach instead of a staggered
one
• The legal and regulatory environment of cybersecurity with specific focus on recovery
requirements and related organizational responsibilities
• Compression algorithms used in backup technologies and their relationship with the
causes and likelihood of backup restoration failure
• A deeper dive into the cause of backup failures such as Hardware failure, software
corruption, and user error.
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APPENDIX B: IRB APPROVAL
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY QUESTIONS
The following questions were presented to the survey participants:

1. Multiple Choice
1. Does your company conduct recovery drills?
a. Yes
b. No
2. If the answer to question 1 is “Yes,” how often on average are the drills conducted?
a. My organization does not conduct recovery drills
b. Monthly (or more)
c. Quarterly
d. Biannually (twice a year)
e. Annually (once a year)
f. Biennially (once every two years)
3. If the answer to question 1 is “Yes,” how often do you meet or exceed the goals set for
recovery?
a. N/A
b. Always
c. Most of the time
d. Half the time
e. Seldom
f. Never
4. Does your company conduct separate recovery drills for natural disasters and manmade incidents (i.e. cyber incidents)?
a. N/A
b. Separate
c. Together/Same
5. What Recovery Metrics do you use to measure success and/or failure, and test your
recovery capabilities?
a. N/A
b. Traditional (RTO/RPO)
c. Other
6. What industry would you consider your organization?
a. Finance
b. Healthcare
c. Public Sector (Government)
d. Energy/Utilities
e. Retail
f. Technology
g. Entertainment
h. Education
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i. Manufacturing
j. Other
7. Is your company subject to any regulatory oversight?
a. Yes
b. No
8. If the answer to Question 7 is “Yes,” does the regulatory body have any requirements
for recovery expectations?
a. Yes, strict.
b. Yes, relaxed.
c. My organization is not subject to regulatory oversight
9. Which of the following will a successful cyber-attack on your organization have the
most impact on?
a. Confidentiality (exposure of sensitive information)
b. Integrity (destruction of data)
c. Availability (denial of service)
d. Other
10. Which if the following variables are considered in the recovery planning?
a. Backup Cadence (frequency with which backups are taken)
b. MTD (Maximum Tolerable Downtime)
c. Other
d. Other (please specify)
11. Which of the following best describes your recovery process?
a. None of the above
b. Alternate site/environment running concurrently (Hot/Cold/Warm Site)
c. Segmented, Tiered or Sequential recovery (storage-> data-> compute->
network-> applications)
12. With regards to time of recovery, how do you best describe the relationship between
the components or layers of your IT environment?
a. Sequential (once component or layer recovered after the other)
b. Staggered and overlapping (recovery of different components can start
concurrently regardless of dependency)
c. Other (please specify)
13. If recovery of systems is layered, are there recovery objectives/metrics established
separately for each layer, application or system?
a. Yes
b. No
c. N/A
14. On a scale of 1-5 (1=Lowest, 5=Highest) how much does “time of failure or breach”
matter with regards to recovery objectives?
a. 1
b. 2
c. 3
d. 4
e. 5
15. On a scale of 1-5 (1=Lowest, 5=Highest) how important is the “time of discovery” of
a breach or failure with regards to recovery objectives?
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a. 1
b. 2
c. 3
d. 4
e. 5
16. What is your organization size?
a. <100
b. 100-500
c. 500-1000
d. 1000-5000
e. >5000
17. Does your organization consider recovery objectives in data protection technology
budgetary decisions?
a. Yes
b. No
18. Do you have recovery objectives for each layer/subsystem (i.e., Database, Network,
Applications), or a general set of objectives?
a. Separate
b. General
19. What percentage of your IT budget is related to Business Continuity and Recovery?
a. >5%
b. 5%-10%
c. 10%-15%
d. 15%-20%
e. >20%
20. Does your company have a different office or administration for Business Continuity
or is it managed by IT?
a. Different Office
b. Managed by IT
21. What does your organization recognize as failure/outage?
a. Partial outage (outage of any of the systems i.e., database, applications, files,
storage)
b. Full outage of all systems
c. Exposure of confidential data (even with all systems fully functional)
d. Compromise of data/services (even with all systems fully functional)
22. Which of the following does your organization recognize for the purpose of recovery
objectives?
a. Time of discovery
b. Time of impact
c. Time of breach
d. None of the above
23. Does your organization have an official declaration of disaster and start of the
“recovery” clock?
a. Yes
b. No
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24. Does your organization distinguish between “time of breach” (if known), “time of
discovery,” and “time of impact” if there is significant lapse of time between them for
recovery metrics purposes?
a. Yes
b. No
25. On a scale of 1 – 5 how easy or hard is it to implement company-wide administrative
(non-technical) information security controls that affect the entire organization (1 –
easiest, 5 = Hardest)?
a. 1
b. 2
c. 3
d. 4
e. 5

2. Short Response
1. Briefly describe what the consequences of a successful cyber-attack on your
organization would be.
2. How are the variables of the recovery objectives derived/modified? (i.e., RTO, RPO)?
3. If the answer to question 1 in the Quantitative Inquiry section was “Yes,” (meaning
that you do conduct recovery drills) what kind of drills do you conduct? Please
provide a brief description.
4. How is official time of failure acknowledged? Is there an official declaration of
disaster or is system failure acknowledged whenever your team discovers that certain
services or systems are no longer functioning as expected?
5. Aside from regulatory requirements (if applicable) what are your organization’s other
motivations for establishing recovery objectives?
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APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AR – Actual Recovery Target Point
BIA – Business Impact Analysis
CIA – Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
CDP – Continuous Data Protection
CRT – Current Recovery Time
DRP – Disaster Recovery Planning
DSR – Design Science Research
ETIF – Elapsed Time to Identify Failure
ETIT – Elapsed Time to Identify Threat
IRB – Institutional Review Board
IT – Information Technology
MAO – Maximum Allowable Outage
MoE – Measure of Effectiveness
MoP – Measure of Performance
MTD – Maximum Tolerable Downtime
MTPD – Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption
NERC – North American Energy Reliability Commission
RPO – Recovery Point Objective
RTE – Recovery Time Effort
RTO – Recovery Time Objective
tA – Time of Acknowledgement
tD – Time of Discovery
tI – Time of Impact
tP – Timing Priority
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APPENDIX E: DEMONSTRATION EXHIBIT

